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TURDS, TRAITORS AND TOSSERS: THE ABUSE OF UK MPS 
VIA TWITTER 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The murder of the Jo Cox MP in June 2016 drew attention to the abuse, threats and violence 
directed towards political representatives in democracies. Though there was no evidence that 
Cox’s killer had directly engaged in online harassment, it highlighted the experiences of abuse 
towards MPs on social media platforms. Twitter threats, impersonations and trolling became an 
increasing matter of concern, as a number of MPs highlighted the almost daily barrage of abusive 
and threatening messages. Besides the obvious threat to MPs themselves, social media sites have 
been accused of facilitating the coarsening of democratic debate and allowing for the 
normalization of abuse, particularly against female representatives. At one level, social media 
abuse could be the latest chapter in a long history of attacks on politicians – some have even 
suggested that abuse is simply a reflection of political anger and that any attempts to control 
social media platforms are a means of protecting politicians from the strength of public opinion 
(O’Neill, 2015). Alternatively, online abuse has been perceived as a symptom of apparently 
increasing levels of political polarisation in western democracies. The Deputy Speaker of the 
House of Commons, has argued recently that online abuse undermines democracy by potentially 
restricting debate on emotive issues for fear of abuse (Home Affairs Select Committee, 2017).  
 
Despite the obvious political concerns and media attention, there has been relatively limited 
specific research on the phenomenon and few attempts to actively quantify the extent of the 
problem.1 Anecdotal media reporting suggests high and increasing levels of abuse on Twitter, in 
particular. This research, attempts to provide a benchmark through quantifying the extent, scale 
and nature of the abuse of MPs via Twitter, as well as exploring some of the causes. Additionally, 
we have sought to gather evidence on those engaged in abuse – are they the stereotypical spotty-
youth loners? Or, are there common patterns, networks and profiles to abusers? To assess these 
questions, we gathered a dataset of over 270,717 tweets sent directly to the 573 UK MPs with 
Twitter accounts over a two and half month period (November 2016-January 2017). These were 
sifted to identify around 7,000 tweets that contained abusive messages or hate speech (see 
definitions below) which were then further analysed. 
 
 
MPS, ABUSE AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Given that social media abuse is a relatively new phenomenon it is perhaps not surprising that 
there is a relatively limited pool of previous academic research and literature. Despite the lack of 
literature, contextual information is available through media reports of the abuse of MPs. In 
analysing the disparate academic literature, four explanatory themes emerge: long-standing 
concerns with mental illness; the nature of social media technologies and their associated 
communication styles; politically based explanations which see abuse stimulated by a growth of 
political polarization or extremism; and, finally, explanations which view abuse in terms of 
broader social problems around identity. 
 
Psychological explanations: Mental illness  
Whilst there has been increased recent attention on social media abuse of MPs it is worth 
remembering that politicians have always been on the receiving end of abuse, threats and 
violence; with reports dating back from over one-hundred years (James et al, 2013). Although the 
lack of research pre-social media and the more private nature of communications make it 
somewhat difficult to accurately compare eras. Nevertheless, one long-standing explanation of 
threats and abuse towards MPs is the connection to mental illness and psychological disorders as 
                                                        
1 A subsequent study of social media abuse directed at candidates, (rather than MPs), in 2017 UK 
election was conducted by a research team at University Sheffield in collaboration with Buzzfeed. The 
results of the study were similar in terms of overall levels of abuse and gendered nature of abuse 
(Buzzfeed, 2017b). 
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explanations for abuse of public figures generally (James et al, 2007; Dietz and Martell, 1989). 
Many of these types of studies originate from the psychiatry or social psychology research fields. 
In the main, they involve self-reporting from MPs and focus on threatening behaviour, physical 
attacks, and stalking rather than abuse per se. Yet, research going back to the 1980s indicates the 
prevalence of links between some forms of mental illness and the targeting of politicians. MPs 
attract abuse due to their increased public profile, along with associated perception as people 
with power, that attracts members of the public with ‘idiosyncratic personal causes or quests for 
justice in a manner that has attracted the term ‘fixation’’. (James et al, 2016:2). 
 
More recent studies in a range of democracies, (UK, US, Canada, Australia, Norway, New 
Zealand), appear to highlight high levels of abuse and threatening behaviour including physical 
attacks, stalking, harassment, threats and inappropriate communications and common links to 
mental disorders amongst abusers (Adams et al, 2009; James et al, 2016; Pathe et al, 2014; 
Schoeneman-Morris et al, 2007). However, one study, (from New Zealand), notes that whilst 
MPs are reporting high levels of social media abuse/threats, compared to face-to-face meetings it 
was more difficult to determine whether mental illness was a factor. Furthermore, MPs tended to 
believe that abuse via social media was prompted by political disenchantment and less likely to 
lead to violence (Every-Palmer et al, 2015). Other research has suggested a more mundane factor 
in online abuse - boredom and a desire to attract attention afforded by anonymity, rather than a 
political or serious threat to endanger (Buckels, et al, 2014; Shachaf & Hara, 2010). This suggests 
that while online abuse is unpleasant and threats are often made, these are an aspect of online 
abuse, or trolling, to a well-known figure rather than a necessary indication or threat to injure. 
Technological Explanations: Anonymity and Personalisation 
A second area of research focuses on the nature of the technological platforms themselves, 
especially social media, and resulting changes in communication style. The internet has often 
been viewed as intensifying, accelerating and even routinising the problem of abuse. This is 
somewhat ironic given the high, normative, hopes in the e-democracy literature (Barber 1998; 
Coleman, 1999, Shane 2004). Initially, such technologies were seen as having the potential to 
foster a more continuous, inclusive, conversational and mutually understanding relationship 
between the represented and their representatives (Coleman, 1999, 2005; Jackson, 2003; Lilleker 
and Jackson, 2014; Williamson, 2009). Subsequent empirical research, led to regular criticisms 
that MPs were failing to use the full potential of interactive technologies, ignoring dialogue and 
focusing on broadcasting or political marketing thus further distancing themselves from the 
public (Jackson and Lilleker, 2010; Williamson 2009; Francoli and Ward, 2008).  
Social media communication, is impacting on the quality of engagement for a number of reasons: 
Firstly, the relative low cost of communication, arguably means that it is easier to access 
representatives than ever before (Shulman, 2009). The downside to this is that because 
communication is easy and immediate, it can stimulate more emotional and less thought-through 
engagement (Papacharissi, 2004; Rowe, 2015). Secondly, on some internet platforms, the 
anonymity provided contributes to what have been referred to as disinhibition effects (Suler, 
2004; Joinson, 2007) - where citizens are freed from social cues and constraints to express views 
publicly in ways that they wouldn’t in everyday conversation. The anonymity factor is also 
seemingly further strengthened by a sense that social media spheres are somehow not subject to 
same legal restraints as traditional media or face-to-face communication and that perpetrators of 
abuse are unlikely to face sanction. Thirdly, the nature of communication online, it has been 
argued, has become more informal and more personalized. At one level, this reflects longer-term 
shifts in social attitudes towards authority figures that have become less deferential and 
hierarchical (Norris, 1999). Social media, such as Twitter, with its relative restriction in terms of 
message length, lends itself towards shorter, punchier forms of communication, arguably 
bringing with it the risk of more direct and impolite statements. Several studies have noted a 
growth in the informalisation and personalization of political communication online (Serfaty, 
2010) and a blurring of the boundaries between private and public spheres. Politicians are now 
often advised to seek authenticity in their online personas and to humanize themselves through 
increasing levels of personalization (Hermans and Vergeer, 2013; Karvonen, 2010). Arguably, 
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such strategies and language also invite more personalized (negative) comments in return. For 
instance, Theocharis et al’s (2016) study of 2015 EU election candidates in a range of countries 
found that those engaging in dialogue and interaction tended to generate more negativity in 
return, although they couldn’t determine causality. 
Political explanations: the Polarisation of Debate? 
A more politically focused and increasingly popular explanation of social media abuse is the 
notion of increasing levels of polarization and populism amongst electorates in many western 
democracies. This links abuse and threats to a more extreme and divided climate of political 
debate, which, whilst not new, has been accelerated by the information and communication 
environment online (Prior, 2013; Leikes et al, 2015; Colleoni et al 2015). The internet’s role in 
polarization has been disputed (Barbara, 2015) but its apparent facilitation of divided and abusive 
communication sphere rests on a number of factors: Firstly, the internet has been seen as 
increasing the number of partisan sources in circulation which are not subject to the same 
professional journalistic standards as traditional media. Secondly, voters increasingly consume 
such partisan content based on selective exposure i.e. they are drawn to material that backs up 
pre-existing beliefs or interests (Prior 2007). Thirdly, selective exposure is then interlinked with, 
people’s online networks and filters. In part, this reflects automated filter bubbles which select or 
organize what we see online based on previous browsing history. Additionally, the argument 
behind polarization suggests that our online networks are largely homogenous, with like-minded 
people communicating with one another (McPherson et al, 2001; Sunstein, 2009). Hence, Twitter, 
is often seen as an echo-chamber where people of similar political outlooks spread or replicate 
each other’s messages but are rarely challenged by alternatives viewpoints. The suggested longer-
term impact of increased exposure to like-minded views is the adoption of more extreme 
positions (Mutz and Martin, 2001). This filtering is then heightened by the aforementioned 
anonymity reducing social and psychological inhibitions and thus stimulating some individuals to 
express more extreme views and indulge in abuse of opponents (Joinson, 2007).  
 
In the UK, mainstream media has linked upsurges in general levels of abuse against MPs to the 
increasingly divided and oppositional nature of politics heightened by several recent and ongoing 
debates. The binary (yes/no) nature of two recent referenda in the UK (the 2014 Scottish 
Independence and the 2016 EU referenda) have been viewed as significantly heightening the 
polarized nature of UK political debate.  In the wake of the Brexit vote, there were many high-
profile accounts of direct threats and hate speech mainly over social media. For example, David 
Lammy, (Labour MP, Tottenham), reported a welter of racist abuse on social media to the Police 
following his call to block Brexit (Guardian, 4 July 2016). Anna Soubry MP a leading Conservative 
remain supporter also reported death threats (Independent, 2 December, 2016). From the leave 
perspective, Rebecca Harris (Conservative MP, Castle Point,) has claimed in relation to online 
abuse:  
 
Another shocking thing in the wake of Brexit is that nice, normally liberal-minded people—
people who would profess to be progressives—also think it is reasonable to abuse 17 million 
of their fellow countrymen…. They turn into keyboard warriors and say things that they 
would never dream of saying face to face to an individual (Hansard, 7 July 2016). 
 
Whilst polarization is often seen as heightening partisan divisions, intra party divisions can also 
generate highly polarized debates. In the UK, the arguments within the Labour Party between 
supporters of Jeremy Corbyn and his opponents within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) led 
to continual claims of abuse from both sides. The parliamentary vote of bombing of Syria 
(December 2015) sparked several reports of offensive messages including death threats to 25 
Labour MPs who supported bombing (in opposition to Corbyn’s position). Challenges to 
Corbyn’s leadership also seemed to have provoked significant abuse. For example, MP Angela 
Eagle’s Facebook tribute to Jo Cox was targeted by apparently Corbyn-supporting trolls whilst 
Corbyn opponent Tom Blenkinsopp MP reported one abuser to the police who was 
subsequently revealed to be a fellow party member (Gazette, 1 July 2016).  
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Identity factors: gender and race 
The more technological determinist explanations of online abuse might lead us to expect 
generalized and randomised abuse towards MPs. Yet, both anecdotal and research-led reports 
indicate that certain types of MPs are targeted for social media abuse. Moreover, this is not 
simply just a question of the volume of abuse but also the nature of that abuse. In particular, 
media coverage has focused on abuse and threats directed at female representatives, (especially, 
younger women MPs), and those from ethnic minorities. Recent evidence given to the Home 
Affairs Select Committee indicated that Muslim and Jewish women were indeed the prime targets 
of abuse (Home Affairs, Select Committee, 2017).  
 
Female MPs themselves have repeatedly reported widespread and alarming levels of threats of 
sexual violence and repeated harassment, as well as more general misogynistic comments. In the 
UK, two men have been jailed for online threats made against MPs (Stella Creasy, 2014 and 
Luciana Berger, 2016), whilst Jess Phillips MP revealed that she had received over 600 rape 
threats in one evening via Twitter (Daily Telegraph, 31 May 2016). A recent BBC Radio 5 survey of 
female MPs (from all parties) indicated that the overwhelming majority (nine out of ten) reported 
receiving online and verbal abuse from the public whilst a third had considered quitting as a 
result (BBC News, 25 January 2017).  
 
Interestingly, and perhaps revealingly, this does not seem to be simply a UK problem. The Inter-
Parliamentary Union research identified global issues of abuse and harassment suffered by female 
representatives in wide range of countries and political systems. The research further noted that 
the general abuse of female representatives tended to be heightened by three factors: age; 
ethnicity and length of service. Younger representatives of minority ethnic backgrounds suffered 
more abuse especially when first elected (IPU, 2016). Media reports from Canada, Ireland and 
Italy in the past year all indicate similar patterns of threats and abuse via social media platforms 
(CBC News, 2016, 2017; the Journal.ie, 2016; BuzzFeed News, 2017a).  
In part, the abuse of female politicians has been linked to the high level of misogyny online 
(Demos, 2014, 2016). Arguably, this is then exacerbated in political context where research 
suggests that political online discussion, in a range of countries, has consistently shown to be 
dominated by men (Stromer-Galley, 2002; Harp and Tremayne, 2006; Trammell and 
Keshelashvili, 2005; Albrecht, 2006; Jensen, 2003). Some studies have argued, that directed 
threats against women MPs relate to attempts to delegitimise female politicians, restrict their 
rights to communicate and inhibit them from taking active part in the political arena but also 
sense that abusers feel threatened by high profile woman politicians speaking out (IPU, 2016). 
All these approaches have pointed towards a significant increase in the abuse of MPs with social 
media being a key driver. Although overall abuse is a considered to have grown, certain types of 
threatening and violent messages are also seen as becoming particularly prevalent and targeted at 
certain demographic groups of MPs. Yet, whilst this may be the case, reviewing existing studies 
highlights several related remaining problems. Firstly, there is a limited amount of consistent and 
precise empirical evidence. Secondly, comparing longitudinally over time between pre-internet 
and internet eras remains problematic, as prior to the emergence of social media platforms much 
of the communication between representatives and represented was essentially private. Thirdly, 
methodologically, there are issues both around definitions of abuse and the fact that recent 
studies tend to rely on self-reporting by MPs that are potentially fraught with inconsistency. 
Finally, there is also a need for theory-building around catalysts and drivers for social media 
abuse. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In light of the above discussion, the main objective of our study was to provide some 
quantifiable evidence of abuse on Twitter and provide a benchmark for future empirical studies. 
Therefore, we sought to answer a number of broad questions: 
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 What is scale and extent of direct abuse of MPs via Twitter?  Whilst the assumption is that abuse 
via social media is widespread and growing – there is very little quantitative evidence. 
James et al’s (2016) UK study, using 2010 data, indicated 10% of MPs reporting abuse via 
social media but this was at a relatively early stage of social media development. 
Consequently, we wanted to quantify both the overall level of abuse (volume) the spread 
amongst MPs i.e. how many MPs received abusive tweets. 
 
 Are there particular patterns and targets amongst MPs for abuse? In line with expectations that 
some individuals and groups of MPs are targeted more than others, we sought to 
identify: (a) which individual MPs were targeted; (b) whether particular groups of MPs 
were targeted (either by party, gender or ethnicity). Given the level of reported abuse 
aimed at women representatives – we were particularly interested to see whether our 
data confirmed this. 
 
 What types of abuse are prevalent and are certain types of abuse directed at particular MPs?  While 
there is standard definitions for hate speech and identifying threatening communication 
is arguably easier, we were interested in whether we could effectively categorise abuse. 
Additionally, we wanted to how far abuse could be linked to distinct political debates 
(such as Brexit) and whether particular groups of MPs received more threatening types 
of communication. 
 
 Are there any patterns or profiles of twitter-politician abusers? The stereotypes of internet 
trolls/abusers is of social inadequate young males with addictions to technology. We 
sought to find out whether there were serial abusers of politicians generally, whether 
there were networks of Twitter abusers and again whether there is any political or 
demographic dimensions to this. 
 
DATA & METHODS 
To answer our research questions there were several methodological hurdles: definitional issues 
around what constitutes abuse; how to apply such definitions in a social media environment; how 
to detect abuse; and how to determine the boundaries of MP abuse. 
 
Defining Abusive Tweets and Hate-speech 
There is considerable and complex debates surrounding the definitions of abuse and hate-speech. 
Each definition has at least some level of subjectivity alongside a mix of cultural factors. Previous 
approaches to defining abuse and hate-speech have used purposely-broad definitions. Burnap 
and Williams (2013), for example, allowed their human coders to self-define what hate-speech 
was. Alternatively, other researchers allow victims to define what they would consider abusive 
(Farris et al, 2016). However, the methodological approach here, required a much more robust 
understanding before the data set could be coded. 
 
 
Definition of Abuse 
Definitions of harassment or abuse generally cover a wide range of content that has the intention 
to disturb or insult an intended person. However, there are two ontological approaches that 
divide most definitions. The first have their foundations either in defining abuse as an 
action/intention, or as an impact on a victim. For example, Lenhart et al’s (2016) definition is that 
harassment is “unwanted contact that is used to create an intimidating, annoying, frightening, or 
even hostile environment for the victim” [emphasis added]. The focus here is on abuse/harassment 
being felt by the victim and not the action itself. The second set of definitions base their 
conception of abuse on the act of abuse, whereby the action, or intention, of the message itself is 
the basis for abuse. This can be seen in Bartlett et al (2014) whereby messages on Twitter were 
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used to find abuse, and, therefore, could not test if victims felt abused. This highlights the issue 
with victim-based definitions in research; in each case of abuse, one must know that the victim 
feels abused or harassed. In comparison, action-based definitions can be taken from the message 
itself, if the context is also considered.  
 
Computer science approaches provide a further method for defining abuse. Definitions from this 
discipline, rely on libraries of words which can be used to identify abusive content instead of 
traditional definitions.2 However, this has its own issues that make it unsuitable for this type of 
research. Applying a keyword-based methodology to Twitter messages has proven highly 
unreliable (Nobata et al, 2016: 146). Furthermore, libraries of words do not in themselves provide 
context like the issues with sentiment analysis (discussed below). So, while the computer science 
approach might be useful in identifying negative messages, machine algorithms cannot 
automatically detect, with a high degree of accuracy, the complex and subjective nature of abuse. 
  
For the reasons, above, we used Bartlett et al’s definition of abuse on Twitter, where abuse is 
defined as messages directed at a specific person with the intent to cause harm or distress. This 
can include casual use of slurs of derogatory stereotypes, so long as it is a specific and is personal 
attack at “you”. (2014:24). This definition while open to some interpretation, allows itself to be 
coded directly into the dataset. Thus, tweets which are found to contain offensive or profane 
words directed to an MP can be argued to be abusive (see Table 1). 
 
Definition of Hate-speech 
Hate speech can be defined as an expression of hatred towards a group, based on protected 
characteristics (such as ethic background, religious identity, sexuality, or gender) especially so 
towards groups who do, or have, faced structural and societal disadvantage (Ferris et al, 2016:5). 
However, as with all definitions concerned with a subjective area, there has been a significant 
debate about what can be considered hate-speech. 
 
Sellers (2016:25-30) conducted a comprehensive review of the definitions of hate-speech across 
common vernacular, academic, and legal. It was found that most definitions of hate-speech 
contain eight common themes: 
 
1)  Insults or undesirable communication to a specific or easily identifiable group 
2) Content that expresses hatred towards groups 
3) Speech that causes harm 
4) When the speaker intends harm or bad activity 
5) The speech incites bad actions beyond the speech itself 
6)  The speech is either public or directed at a member of the public 
7) The context makes violent response possible 
8) The speech has no redeeming purpose 
 
What is clear from this framework is that while most forms of hate-speech can be considered 
harassment or abuse; not all abuse is hate-speech. Furthermore, it gives a working framework for 
deciphering what is hate-speech without the input of this papers authors, mitigating our own 
personal subjectivity while managing a definition. 
 
Using these definitions, we created a classification system for the identification of abuse on 
Twitter towards MPs. This simple classification put tweets towards MPs into one of four 
categories: Non-abusive, Not-directed, Abusive, or Hate-speech (See Table 1). 
                                                        
2 See also Luis Von Ahn’s list of offensive/profane words:  https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~biglou/resources/ 
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Data Collection 
The findings of this paper were generated by a dataset of 270,717 tweets collected from 
November 14, 2016 to January 28th, 2017 to MPs by Twitter users. The actual number of Tweets 
collected in the database was more than this, but were filtered out to exclude spam, empty or 
repeated tweets. For the data collection, we utilized the Twitter collection software TAGs3. This 
tool automates the data collection process by routinely accessing Twitter’s search API with a 
query and returning with tweets that fit the search parameters inputted alongside associated 
meta-data. A potential challenge with this method is that while Twitter does have tools to deal 
with abusive messages, details about its implementation are a closely guarded secret (Ho, 2017). 
Therefore, it is possible that Twitter may have removed abusive tweets before they were 
collected. However, as displayed below, the level of abusive messages collected is ample for 
analysis. 
 
The identification of tweets sent to MPs was simplified by the structure of Twitter. Users of the 
social media platform often self-code tweets through either hashtags, or, by directing their posts 
to specific intended audiences. In the case of hashtags, users can precede a word, category, or 
phrase by a hash symbol (#<word>) to denote that the tweet is on a particular subject, or give 
the tweet an envisioned purpose. To specify an immediate audience, users can include the 
mention function (@<recipient handle>) that can take the form of direct messages to the recipient, 
replies to a recipient’s tweet, or simply mentioning them in a standard tweet. Alternatively, users 
can choose not to code the messages if their intended immediate audience is to be limited to 
others who follow them directly. For this research, the self-coding of tweets avoids some of the 
methodological issues present in social media research (Murthy, 2017). It can be assumed if a 
user is directing or notifying another they are trying to communicate with them, and this can be 
distinguished from all other tweets through the following search term: 
 
To:@<MPsTwitterHandle1> OR  @<MPsTwitterHandle2> OR 
@<MPsTwitterHandle3>… 
 
 
                                                        
3 TAGS (or Twitter Archive Google Sheets) and is available at https://tags.hawksey.info/ 
TABLE 1: EXAMPLE OF ABUSE/HATE-SPEECH CLASSIFICATION 
Classification Reasoning Examples 
Non-abusive 
Tweet contains no profanity or 
derogatory language 
 @<MPsHandle> Can you tell me how you intend to 
vote in tonight’s debate 
 I hope I get to see @<MPsHandle> tonight! 
Not-directed 
Tweet contains abusive slurs or 
hate-speech, but not directed 
towards the MP 
 Fucking Pot holes again. @<MPsHandle> Sort it 
out. 
 That group are a bunch of whores. I hope 
@<MPsHandle> kicks them out. 
Abusive 
Abusive, profane language 
directed towards an MP 
 @<MPsHandle> You’re a Wanker 
 I hope that @<MPsHandle> knows he’s a complete 
fucker. 
Hate-speech 
Profane or derogatory language 
which relates to a characteristic 
the MP belongs; language which 
implicitly or explicitly implies or 
encourages threats towards an 
MP 
 @<MPsHandle> is a stupid kike. 
 Well that proves how much of a slut @<MPsH 
andle> is. 
 I hope @<MPsHandle> gets what’s coming to him: 
A baseball bat. 
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This search term was expanded to include all MPs Twitter handles and then imported to TAGs 
for data collection. The MPs’ Twitter handles used in the search were taken from a pre-collected 
database of all verified Twitter accounts which included an MP’s Twitter handle, age, gender, 
party affiliation, constituency, and account details which included age of the account, activity, and 
biographic information. This database of MPs account handles (n=573) was updated on a weekly 
basis to check for MPs who had left or joined the service throughout the data collection period.  
Detecting Abusive Tweets and Hate-speech 
Using the definition of abuse described above, we created a semi-automated process for the 
identification of abusive tweets and those that contained hate-speech. Fully automated 
classification systems have been used to classify tweets through methods such as sentiment 
analysis, distant supervision, or machine learning (Ratkiewicz et al, 2011; Chen, 2012; Burnap & 
Williams, 2013). These auto-classifiers still present wide margins of error and despite becoming 
more accurate they are far from perfect. Human coding of the entire dataset would be a 
preferable alternative but there are issues of resource, human error, and subjectivity (Sloane, 
2017:168). An optimal method would be to use human intelligence tasks (HITs) to code the data, 
however, this does come with significant resource requirements (Buhrmester et al, 2011; Sloane et 
al, 2015). Consequently, a multi-layered approach was taken which used sentiment analysis, 
keyword identification, and manual verification to identify abusive and hateful tweets within the 
dataset.  
 
Firstly, sentiment analysis (SentiStrength) was applied to the dataset (Thelwall et al, 2012). This 
software uses a lexical approach to detect both positive and negative sentiment strength. Each 
tweet was ranked from most negative sentiment to least negative sentiment using two scores. 
These two scores were taken from the SentiStrength analysis: a positive sentiment score, a figure is 
given from 1 (no positive sentiment) to 5 (very strong positive sentiment); and for negative 
sentiment a figure is given from -1 (no negative sentiment) to -5 (very strong negative sentiment). 
Sentiment analysis systems are good at understanding the overall sentiment of a tweet, however, 
the system cannot detect the direction of the sentiment. For example, a tweet to an MP may be 
insulting, triggering a high negative sentiment, but the analysis tool cannot detect if this negativity 
is directed towards the MP. The system was useful for ranking all the tweets by overall sentiment, 
which significantly increased the speed of the second stage of analysis. 
 
The second step was to code the top 3,000 negative tweets manually. The definition 
classifications of abuse and hate speech mentioned above was used to detect if the tweet was 
abusive or hateful, and then defined if this tweet was directed towards the MP. These codes were 
then analysed through a summative content and thematic analysis; which identified, and reported 
patterns of use of particular keywords (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A total of 78 abusive or hateful 
keywords were extracted.  
 
The third step was to filter the dataset for tweets that contained any one of the identified 
keywords. Each tweet was then manually verified to determine if the tweet was abusive or could 
be considered hate-speech. If tested positive for abuse, we then verified if the MP was the 
intended recipient of the abuse or hate speech.  
 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to this type of social media research. Firstly, there are limitations on 
the of Twitter’s public search API. The data accessible through this API has restrictions on the 
number of calls and a cap on the amount of data at any given time (Voss et al, 2017: 244). This 
was mitigated using TAGs where the collection of tweets was scheduled to avoid the limits set by 
the Twitter API.  
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Secondly, it is expected that the data collection and detection methodologies will underreport on 
the levels of tweets that contain abuse and hate-speech. Twitter has recognised that the service 
does enable a significant amount of abuse and hate speech, and have taken some action to reduce 
the amount on their platform. The exact method of how Twitter detects and removes these 
tweets, either through user reports or automated methods is a secret, to reduce the ability of 
abusers to develop a work-a-round. This could mean that some abusive messages sent to MPs 
may have been deleted before our collection methods could add them to our dataset. 
Additionally, our method for detecting abusive messages focuses on the detection of abuse and 
hate-speech using keywords with a high frequency of abuse and hate-speech. This could allow 
some abusive terms that are less prevalent to be excluded. In addition to this, users may 
intentionally obscure offensive words (Nobata et al, 2016:146). For example, replacing some 
letters with non-alphanumeric characters such as the use of dollar signs instead of an ‘s’.  The 
dataset was developed with the assumption that it marginally underreports abuse and hate-
speech.  
 
A third limitation of the research method is the reliance on textual communications, as most 
messages on Twitter are textual. However, previous research has indicated that a large amount of 
communication is through both image and video mediums (Laird, 2012).  
 
Finally, political events inevitably lead to individual MPs receiving more hate-speech than they 
would otherwise attract. For example, Phillip Davies MP, Anna Soubry MP, and Tim Farron MP 
received a significant amount of online communication over specific events or actions. It is also 
worth considering that the data collection period included festive holidays, which may have 
resulted in lower levels of abuse or hate speech towards MPs.  
FINDINGS 
Overall Scale of Abuse  
The first area of enquiry within this research was to detect the overall scale of abuse towards MPs 
on Twitter. Notable journalistic claims have been made surrounding the nature of abuse to MPs 
online. So far there has not been any clear indication of the overall levels of abuse/hate speech 
through the Twitter service or online abuse in general (Buckels, et al, 2014: 97). From the total 
coded dataset of tweets to MPs (N=270,717) it was found that the proportion tweets which were 
classified as ‘abusive’ made up 2.57% of the dataset (n=6,952). In other terms, twenty-five 
messages in every thousand tweets contain some type of direct abuse towards an MP. 
 
Despite overall levels of abuse, it was expected that individual MPs would attract different levels 
of abuse. This is reflected in the dataset. The average MP received 17.99 abusive messages, with a 
standard deviation of 48.9, and a range of 0 to 677 abusive messages. This suggests that the level 
of abuse is dependent on other factors than simply being an MP. 
 
In total, 62% of the MPs had at least one abusive tweet sent to them during the two months 
(N=569; n=370). This is significantly more than the 10.1% of MPs who had reported receiving 
‘inappropriate social media contact’ in James et al’s 2010 survey of UK MPs (2016:10). This is an 
indication of one of three options: levels of abuse on social media has increased; abuse has 
remained consistent for each MP but more MPs are now on the service to be abused; or simply 
that each MPs perception of abuse is different and was therefore under-reported in 2010. 
However, in reference to the James et al survey of MPs, the number of MPs abused on Twitter is 
more similar to the amount of abuse received by MPs by letters, fax, or emails with 63.9% of 
MPs reporting abuse/harassment through these mediums (2016:10). This implies, that while the 
scale of abuse may be different, the number of MPs being abused remains comparable to other 
predominantly textual mediums. 
 
Posts which included hate speech towards MPs occurred at a significantly reduced frequency to 
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those categorised as abusive. Only 0.42% of tweets contained some type of hate speech (n=125) 
out of the total. Furthermore, the scope of MPs sent tweets containing hate-speech was 
considerably lower; with 6.6% of MPs receiving some form of hate speech (n=38). The only 
comparable research is from Ethiopia which found that 0.7% of all online political 
communication contained hate-speech (Gagliardone et al, 2016). In this research, evidence from 
Ethiopia, anecdotal evidence, and news presence suggested that political hate-speech is more 
widespread than what this data suggests. 
 
The timeline of when the abusive tweets occurred indicates that abuse was not consistent across 
the data collection period. Indeed, there is evidence of significant groupings of abuse on 
particular days. Most notably, there was a significant spike of abuse on December 7th. It can be 
considered that abuse is not a day-to-day occurrence, but instead fuelled by outside factors, 
political events, or current affairs stories. December 7th, for example, was the day that the House 
of Commons voted on the Government’s Brexit timetable.  Common user traits of social media 
are visible, for example, less abuse on the weekends aligns with when people use Twitter. 
However, there are significant deviations that indicate that abuse is reactive to outside factors. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Abusive Tweets by Date 
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Overall, the evidence suggests that most MPs encounter abuse to some extent on Twitter with 
the level of abuse differing substantially from one MP to another. Therefore, we tested the levels 
of abuse across three characteristics: recognition (measured by total tweets received), gender, and 
political party. The characteristics were tested with the overall dataset, and then again with an 
interquartile dataset to test the ‘average’ experience of MPs by treating the experience of the top 
and bottom twenty-five per cent of MPs in terms of recognition as outliers. This provided a 
different perspective of abuse towards MPs. 
 
 
TABLE 2: MPS WITH MORE THAN FIFTY ABUSIVE TWEETS 
MPs Handle 
No. 
Abusive 
Tweets 
Total No. 
Tweets 
% of 
Tweets 
Abusive 
Jeremycorbyn 677 16,944 4.00 
Timfarron 438 5,133 8.53 
BorisJohnson 409 9,452 4.33 
Michaelgove 329 4,234 7.77 
theresa_may 273 11,779 2.32 
Anna_Soubry 264 7,582 3.48 
ChukaUmunna 243 7,355 3.30 
nick_clegg 223 3,157 7.06 
George_Osborne 198 1,505 13.16 
Jeremy_Hunt 180 2,618 6.88 
Ed_Miliband 161 2,376 6.78 
PhilipDaviesMP 126 966 13.04 
BenPBradshaw 120 1,500 8.00 
AlexSalmond 114 2,521 4.52 
HackneyAbbott 110 2,688 4.09 
DavidTCDavies 109 1,561 6.98 
OwenSmith_MP 104 2,005 5.19 
DavidLammy 101 3,507 2.88 
RhonddaBryant 78 3,521 2.22 
DouglasCarswell 75 2,559 2.93 
SarahChampionMP 72 2,388 3.02 
Jessphillips 72 4,164 1.73 
RichardBurgon 71 3,816 1.86 
Andyburnhammp 57 2,933 1.94 
Labourlewis 55 3,589 1.53 
PHammondMP 51 2,592 1.97 
PeteWishart 51 4,353 1.17 
Total 4,761 116,798    4.07 
 
 
Relationship between recognition against abuse (Overall) 
Measuring the recognition and popularity of an MP in the public eye is fraught with difficulty due 
to the subjective nature of the terms.  However, there are some statistics provided by this 
database which can be used to determine a value for an MPs individual name recognition and 
popularity. Cha et al (2010) found that the number of followers a user has does not necessarily 
relate to the user’s name recognition but does to their overall popularity. There was a relationship 
between mentions and name recognition. Retweets symbolised interest in the content of the 
tweet rather than the poster. Therefore, by using the measures of followers (for popularity of 
MP) and @mentions (for recognition) we could measure the impact of these two fields on abuse 
with linear regression. 
 
The first finding was that increased name recognition has a positive relationship with levels of 
abuse (r=0.893 r2= 0.797 p=<0.01). This indicates that the more an MP is mentioned on 
Twitter, the more abuse they receive.  
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The second finding is that popularity has a positive relationship with abuse, however, this 
relationship is weaker than with name recognition (r=0774. r2= 0.599 p=<0.01). On the 
assumption that a more popular MP will be liked more, and therefore abused less, this finding 
should not be surprising (Chen et al, 2010). 
 
Impact of Gender on levels of abuse received 
Gender has some impact on the level of abuse received by MPs. However, despite media 
reporting of the targeting of female MPs on the service, the data shows that male MPs attract 
more abuse. Male MPs had three per cent of all tweets sent to them being deemed abusive. This 
is in comparison to the 1.7 per cent to female MPs. Alternatively, male MPs receive 30 abusive 
messages in every thousand, compared to the 17 in every thousand received by females. This 
result was tested with a Point Biserial correlation, which found a positive relationship between 
being a male MP and receiving abuse (r= 0.39 p= <.01). However, the R2 (0.02) suggests this 
relationship is only accounts for two per cent of the variation of abusive tweets. Therefore, 
suggesting while there is a relationship between being a male MP and the levels of abuse on 
Twitter, this relationship is not as significant as other factors. However, female MPs received 
significantly higher proportion of hate speech compared to male MPs. Out of all tweets that 
contained hate speech, 86% was directed at females. (N=125, n=108). This result is partly due to 
our classification where offensive gendered slurs counted as hate-speech, but also due to the 
increased levels of hate-speech attracted by women. This result does suggest that while women 
may not receive more unwanted contact than male MPs, the abuse women receive is gendered in 
its content. 
 
Impact of political party on the levels of abuse received 
The initial analysis of abuse towards MPs segmented by political party suggests that being a 
member of a national party with a large vote share in the 2015 General Election attracted a larger 
amount of abuse as a percentage compared to that of parties based in devolved nations of the 
UK with smaller overall vote shares. This aligns with the findings of the popularity section – 
which suggests the most recognised MPs will attract more abuse and these MPs will belong to 
the more recognised political parties. Table 2 displays this relationship. It is worth noting that the 
Liberal Democrats and UKIP are heavily skewed due to individual members. High levels of 
abuse targeted at the Liberal Democats was mostly accounted for by high levels of abuse directed 
to its Leader, (at time of study), Tim Farron MP, similarly UKIP’s abuse was due to Douglas 
Carswell, the party’s only MP.  
 
The interquartile dataset 
During the analysis, it became clear that the overall dataset was affected by high profile MPs, or 
by MPs who had an extremely minimal use of the service. Therefore, to test the average MPs 
experience, we further filtered the data to the interquartile in terms of overall recognition. This 
filtered database contained 284 MPs.  
 
The differences found between the overall and the interquartile show a difference in experience 
between the most popular and average MPs. Firstly, the interquartile MPs are abused significantly 
less. Only 0.95% of tweets to the interquartile contained any abuse, compared to 2.57% of the 
overall dataset. There were only two messages considered hate-speech in the interquartile dataset 
which did not allow for analysis in this area other than to suggest than to confirm that 
recognition is related to hate-speech (n=2; N=51,132). 
 
The interquartile set showed no difference in terms of the gender relationship with abuse. As 
with the overall data, male MPs continued to attract a significant amount of abuse, 1.04% of all 
tweets abusive for male MPs, compared to 0.7% of all tweets to female MPs.  
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PERPETRATORS OF ABUSE 
While there is much to be said about the abuse itself, an overview of the perpetrators of abuse is 
harder to quantify. Cultural stereotypes of online trolls depict most online abusers as young white 
males who abuse to alleviate boredom (Hardaker, 2013; Fichman & Sanfilppo, 2016: 143). 
However, the quantification and description of online trolls is masked on Twitter, in part due to 
the optional anonymity, but also because the service does not collect gender or age information 
from users directly. For these reasons, research into who trolls is problematic. Thus, while some 
user traits can be analysed from the data, other key identifiers could not be found from this 
research. 
 
In addition to perceptions of online abusers being young white males, there is also the belief that 
perpetrators are often nocturnal. For example, Lindsay Hoyle MP called the abusers of MPs 
keyboard warriors who are active at the middle of the night (Home Affairs Select Committee, 
2017). The cultural perceptions created an obvious test: to measure if the abuse of MPs is 
nocturnal in nature. Using our data, we tested if there were any patterns of abuse in terms of time 
of day. It was found that the difference between when abusers attacked MPs and overall tweets 
to MPs was negligible; with the mean abuse occurring at 2:59pm (Std. Dev. = 0.249 days) 
compared to the overall mean of 2:37pm. (Std. Dev. = 0.286 days). This goes some way to dispel 
the myth that all online abusers of MPs are surfing the web late at night, or that the time of day 
can be used to predict when abuse will happen.  
 
One finding is that the perpetrators of abuse towards MPs may do so as a reaction to content by 
MPs within their social awareness streams. In our dataset, tweets were coded to determine if a 
tweet was made directly to the MP, or as a reply to tweet an MP had made. In a test, we found a  
 
positive relationship between abuse and the tweet being in the form of a reply (r=0.22 p=<0.1). 
This counters the notion that perpetrators purposefully go online to abuse, but instead suggests 
that the phenomenon of abuse is more often an immediate reaction triggered by what an abuser 
sees.  
 
 
TABLE 3:  ABUSE BY POLITICAL PARTY 
 
Political Party 
No. Abusive 
Tweets 
Total No. Tweets 
% of Tweets 
Abusive 
No. of MPs in 
sample 
Mean Abuse per 
Party MP 
Lib Dems 678 10,470 6.48 9 75.4 
UKIP 75 2,559 2.93 1 75 
Conservative 2,695 99,087 2.72 276 9.8 
Labour 3,020 128,915 2.34 207 14.6 
Independent 36 1,710 2.11 3 12 
DUP 36 1,757 2.05 7 5.1 
SNP 379 22,650 1.67 53 7.1 
Plaid Cymru 6 514 1.17 3 2 
Green 25 2,370 1.05 1 25 
SDLP 2 284 0.70 3 .67 
Sinn Fein 0 342 N/A 4 .0 
UUP 0 59 N/A 2 .0 
Total 6,952 270,717 2.57 569 12.2 
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Following this, it was found from the list of users who had sent abusive tweets to MPs, overall, 
are not serial transgressors. The 6,952 abusive messages sent to MPs was made by 4,775 Twitter 
users, which gives a mean of 1.4 abusive tweets per user in this list. This is somewhat low when 
contrasted with the whole dataset, whereby 270,717 tweets were sent by 83,648 different Twitter 
users (3.23 messages per user). Many abusers sent only one abusive message (n=3,799), while 
only 28 accounts had sent over 10 abusive messages to MPs. This suggests that abuse is 
distributed across a vast number of different Twitter handles, and overall, is not perpetrated by a 
small group of highly abusive members. Accounts who had tweeted more than one abusive 
message tended to distribute their abusiveness across several MPs.  
 
TABLE 4:   
 
Number of Abusive 
Messages sent 
Frequency of 
Accounts 
1 – 10 4,750 
11- 20 17 
21-30 10 
101-110 1 
Total 4,775 
*No accounts sent abusive messages from a range between 29 to 107 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The level of abuse, on first sight, appears relatively low. Indeed, given the general level of 
contempt for politicians amongst the electorate, we might have expected a greater volume of 
abuse. However, we used a relatively strict definition of abuse i.e. direct to an MP on one 
platform. We were not measuring abuse in general or abuse directed at family members or staff 
for example. Moreover, we have not assessed the totality of abuse across different technological 
platforms. Additionally, it is possible also that some abusive tweets were blocked or removed 
without being captured in our dataset. Since there is little or no previous comparable data, it is 
difficult to tell how far the problem of social media abuse is growing. James et al’s study of self-
reported abuse from 2010 is the only reference point we could find. If we use this as a base, then 
abuse on social media has certainly expanded significantly with many MPs now facing abuse of 
some sort on Twitter and a smaller number receiving more regular abuse. Again, though, how far 
this represents an overall growth in abuse is difficult to interpret since we don’t know whether 
there is a substitution effect here i.e. whether, for example, abusers have moved from email or 
letter to Twitter. 
 
Overall levels of abuse are only one part of the picture though. It is clear that certain individual 
politicians are targeted for abuse. This, not surprisingly, relates to their media profile generally 
and how active they are on Twitter. Gender and party seem to matter less here. However, our 
results do suggest that women MPs attract more hate speech and threatening behaviour. In part, 
this represents definitional issues around hate-speech but also reflects the different tone of abuse 
directed to some female MPs. Whilst not wishing to downplay the impact of abuse, it is worth 
noting that where abusive hate speech occurred, it often led to a significant show of support 
from other Twitter users. Nevertheless, even if the level is relatively low, it is still important to 
consider the perception and fear of abuse and whether this potentially restricts debate and the 
use of social media for connecting with the public. Some MPs have removed themselves from 
Twitter as a result of abuse and some self-censor before communicating on social media. 
 
In terms of the pattern of abuse, our results confirm a more reactive model i.e. that Twitter 
abusers are often responding to something they have seen about the MP online or to the 
discussion of emotive political issues in which MPs have taken part. Abuse clearly relates to the 
nature and profile of political discussion. Hence, abuse peaked in our dataset with the 
parliamentary discussion of Brexit. Similarly, on a more regular basis we can also connect small 
 14 
spikes of abuse to the high profile weekly nature of PMQs. In general, there are some hints here 
of polarized nature of UK political debate on some issues, with several MPs being targeted 
especially for pro-remain views. Interestingly, there is also the appearance of terms of abuse (e.g. 
snowflake) spilling over from the recent highly polarized US presidential debate. 
 
Although more work and research are required to identify abuser profiles and patterns of abuse, 
our initial findings do not necessarily fit the media stereotypes. The majority of abusers do not 
appear to be serial trolls tweeting late at night. Nor did we detect any networks of abusers 
although there was some minor evidence of bot activity. The character of most of the abuse was 
one-off comments in relation to political debates or events. Arguably, these are types of 
comments which would once have been privately shouted at a television screen – however, social 
media has given people more direct access to publicly shout such comments at those in the 
media spotlight. This potentially means that such abuse has more power and impact than past 
private communications, both specifically on the targets of abuse and on a more general 
perception of MPs. The apparently irregular nature of abusers also underlines a theoretical 
problem here. Whilst considerable attention has focused on trolling or cyber-bullying in both 
media discussion and social science literature, these are not necessarily helpful frames for 
understanding much of political abuse online. Most abuse was not from repeat abusers nor was it 
necessarily designed to amuse other tweeters or provoke response from the target as suggested 
by most definitions of trolling. 
 
In sum, this study has attempted to provide an empirical benchmark for assessing abuse of 
politicians and to provide a methodology for doing so. We would argue that analysis of actual 
abuse online provides a more accurate and broader understanding than traditional self-reporting 
studies and, media representations of the problem. Nevertheless, there remains further work to 
be done: firstly, to compare different technological platforms to see whether the nature of 
platforms and the rules and norms around them can influence the civility of discussion. Secondly, 
we need larger, repeat studies to monitor whether social media abuse is growing and, if so, why. 
Thirdly, politics in the UK is often considered as one of the more adversarial political systems 
that potentially could encourage more aggressive forms of contact between politicians and 
citizens. Therefore, it would be useful to have comparative studies to help understand the 
influence of systemic factors (the nature of representative system, the party system, the linkage to 
constituency) to see whether patterns of abuse are replicated cross-nationally. 
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Every-Palmer, S., Barry-Walsh, J., & Pathé, M. (2015). Harassment, stalking, threats and attacks 
targeting New Zealand politicians: A mental health issue. Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Psychiatry, 49, 634–641.  
Farris, R., Ashar, A., Gasser, U., and Joo, D. (2016). Understanding Harmful Speech Online: Networked 
Policy Series. Cambridge, MA: Berkman Klein. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2882824 
Francoli, M. and Ward, S., (2008). ‘21st century soapboxes? MPs and their blogs’. Information 
Polity, 13(1-2): 21-39. 
Gagliardone, I., Pohjonen, M., Beyene, Z., Zerai, A., Aynekulu, G., Bekalu, M., Bright, J., Moges, 
M.A., Seifu, M., Stremlau, N., Taflan, P., Gebrewolde, T.M., and Teferra, Z. (2016). 
Mechachal: Online Debates and Elections in Ethiopia – From Hate Speech to 
Engagement in Social Media. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2831369 
Gazette, (2016) ‘Corbyn row Twitter troll who threatened Labour MP is exposed - as a party 
member’. 1 July. http://www.gazettelive.co.uk/news/teesside-news/corbyn-row-twitter-
troll-who-11550844.  
Guardian, (2016) ‘David Lammy receives death threats after EU referendum result’. 4 July. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/04/david-lammy-receives-death-threat-
after-eu-referendum-result.  
Harp, D., & Tremayne, M. (2006). The gendered blogosphere: Examining inequality using 
network and feminist theory. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 83, 247–64.  
Hermans, L. and Vergeer, M., (2013). ‘Personalization in e-campaigning: A cross-national 
comparison of personalization strategies used on candidate websites of 17 countries in EP 
elections 2009’. New media & society, 15 (1): 72-92. 
Home Affairs Select Committee, (2017) Hate Crime and its violent consequences (HC609) 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/h
ome-affairs-committee/hate-crime-and-its-violent-consequences/oral/49182.html.  
Independent, (2016) ‘Police investigation death threats targeting Remain-supporting 
Conservative MP Anna Soubry’, 2 December. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/anna-soubry-jo-cox-murder-threat-
brexit-eu-referendum-a7452546.html.  
Inter Parliamentary Union (2016) Sexism, Harassment and Violence against Women Parliamentarians, 
Geneva: IPU 
Jackson, N.A. (2003). MPs and web technologies: an untapped opportunity?. Journal of Public 
Affairs, 3 (2): 124-137. 
Jackson, N.A. and Lilleker, D.G. (2009). MPs and E-representation: Me, MySpace and I. British 
Politics, 4(2): .236-264. 
Jackson, N.A. and Lilleker, D. (2011). Microblogging, constituency service and impression 
management: UK MPs and the use of Twitter. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 17 (1): 86-
105. 
James, D.V., Farnham, F.R., Sukhwal, S., Jones, K., Carlisle, J. and Henley, S., (2016). 
Aggressive/intrusive behaviours, harassment and stalking of members of the United 
Kingdom parliament: a prevalence study and cross-national comparison. The Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 27 (2): 177-197. 
James, D.V., Mullen, P., Meloy, J.R., Pathe, M. Farnham, F., Preston, I., and Darnley, B. (2007). 
The Role of Mental Disorder in Attacks on European Politicians, 1990-2004. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 116(5): 334-344.  
Jensen, J. L. (2003). Virtual democratic dialogue? Bringing together citizens and politicians. 
Information Polity, 8, 29–47. 
 17 
Joinson, A. (ed) (2007). Oxford Handbook of Internet Psychology. Oxford: OUP. 
Journal.ie, (2016) We will kill you": Irish politicians speak out against online abuse. 19 June. 
Available at http://www.thejournal.ie/irish-politicians-abuse-online-2833042-Jun2016/  
Karvonen, L., (2010). The personalisation of politics: a study of parliamentary democracies. ECPR Press. 
Laird, S. (2012). Instagram Users Share 10 Hurricane Sandy Photos Per Second. Mashable. 
Available at: http://mashable.com/2012/10/29/instagram-hurricane-sandy/ 
Lelkes, Y., Sood, G. and Iyengar, S. (2015), The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to 
Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect. American Journal of Political Science. 
Lenhart, A., Ybarra, M., Zickuhr, K., and Prince-Freeney, M. (2016). Online Harassment, Digital 
Abuse, and Cyberstalking in America. New York, USA: Data & Society. Available at: 
https://www.datasociety.net/pubs/oh/Online_Harassment_2016.pdf 
Lilleker, D. and Jackson, N., (2014). ‘Interacting and representing: can Web 2.0 enhance the roles 
of an MP?’  ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 14--19 March 2009, Lisbon.  
Lumsden, K., and Morgan, H.M. (2017). Media Framing of Trolling and Online Abuse: Silencing 
Strategies, Symbolic Violence and Victim Blaming. Feminist Media Studies, 17(6). 
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., and Cook, J.M. (2001). “Birds of a feather: Homophily in social 
networks”. Annual Review of Sociology, 28: 415–444.  
Murthy, D. (2017). The Ontology of Tweets: Mixed-Method Approaches to the Study of Twitter. 
In L. Sloan, and A. Quan-Haase. (eds). The Sage Handbook of Social Media Research Methods. 
London: Sage. 
Mutz, D.C. and Martin, P.S. (2001). “Facilitating communication across lines of political 
difference: The role of mass media”. American Political Science Review, 95 (1): 97–114.  
Nobata, C., Tetreault, J., Thomas, A., Mehdad, Y., and Chang, Y. (2016). Abuse Language 
Detection in Online User Content. Proceedings of WWW’16 25th International Conference on 
World Wide Web. (pp.145-153).  
Norris, P. (1999). Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government. OUP Oxford. 
Papacharissi, Z. (2004). ‘Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of 
online political discussion groups’. New Media & Society, 6 (2): 259-283. 
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APPENDIX 1:  
IDENTIFIERS OF ABUSIVE/HATE-SPEECH TWEETS TO MPS 
These are the keywords used as described within the methodology to identify abusive or hate filled 
messages towards MPs. Deviations of these keywords were also used. For example, “fuck off” would also 
identify tweets which included “fuckoff” and “fuck-off”. Plurals of words were also collected.  
 
‘and die’ Faggot Muzzies Snowflake 
Arsehole Fascist Nazi Swamp 
Bastard Fool Nonce Thug 
Bigot Fuck off Nutjob Tosser 
Bitch Fuck You Pedo/paedophile Traitor 
Buffoon Fuckin/fucking Pervert Troll 
Bullshit Golliwog Pillock Turd 
Cock-nosed Hypocritical Piss off Twat 
Cow Ideologue Ponce Undemocratic 
Crony Idiot Prick Vile 
Cunt Imbecile Radical Wanker 
Dick head Kike Rag Head Wankstain 
“Die in” Kuffar Rape Weasle 
Dirty Libtard Redtory WhiteGenocide 
Disgrace Londonistan Retard Whore 
Dishonourable Loon Scum Wretch 
Dumb Loser Shill “You Racist” 
Dyke Lunatic Shit Zealot 
Elitist Moron Slag  
Extremist Murat/Muzrat Sleaze  
 
 
